Incomes, incentives and the growth of means-testing in Hungary by Gerry Redmond
Fiscal Studies (1999) vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 77–99
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1999
Incomes, Incentives and the Growth




The purpose of this paper is to examine the reform of family benefits and the growth of means-
testing in Hungary. From 1996, many family benefits were means-tested for the first time. A new
microsimulation model for Hungary, running on recent survey microdata, is used to simulate the
impact of the 1996 reforms on government expenditures, the distribution of incomes, the targeting
of benefits and effective marginal tax rates. These reforms are found to be largely benign and even
progressive, but they also appear to be paving the way for the further extension of means-testing.
The model is used to investigate such an extension by simulating the impact of a UK-style system
of means-tested family benefits in Hungary. This system achieves some expenditure savings and
better targeting of benefits, but also greatly increases effective marginal tax rates on low-income
households with children. The paper argues that resulting poverty traps may increase child poverty
in Hungary in the longer term and cautions against the overextension of means-testing.
JEL classification: H55, I38, P35.
I. INTRODUCTION
After the collapse of the Communist system, Hungarian governments managing
the economic transformation of their country came under pressure from
international organisations, such as the World Bank and the OECD, to carry out
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fundamental reforms to their benefits system. One of the focal points of this
pressure centred on universal and earnings-related family benefits, which began
to assume increasing importance in the incomes of households with children as
unemployment increased and real earnings declined in value.
After considerable debate, major reforms to family benefits were
implemented in April 1996. The overall impact of these reforms was relatively
mild and the least well-off families were mostly protected from benefit cuts.
However, the reforms were important politically and psychologically, as they
constituted a definitive step away from welfare built up during the Communist
era and towards a western model of centralised and standardised means-testing
procedures for millions of families.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the reform of family benefits and the
growth of means-testing in Hungary, focusing on the targeting of benefits, their
distributional impacts and their effect on incentives to work. The paper also
investigates the potential impacts of a more fully means-tested system of family
benefits in Hungary by asking: ‘what would be the effect on targeting, household
incomes and incentives of introducing a system of means-tested family benefits
in Hungary, such as the one that exists in the UK?’. The paper argues that, while
undoubtedly helping to target benefits at the poorest families, a UK-style family
benefits regime would also create considerable incentive problems that have not
so far existed in the Hungarian benefits system.
The targeting of welfare and the impact of welfare reforms on incentives to
work are important areas of analysis in social policy. There is a growing
literature on welfare reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Much of this
research has argued against universalism and in favour of greater means-testing
(Standing, 1996). Coulter et al. (1997) suggest that the means-testing of family
benefits in the Czech Republic, while improving the targeting of benefits, also
resulted in limited disincentive effects. They do not, however, examine the
impact of a more fully means-tested system in terms of targeting and incentives.
It is in this area that the present paper makes a contribution that has relevance
not just for Hungary, but also for other economies in transition that are facing
similar welfare policy dilemmas. The results in this analysis suggest that benefit
targeting that focuses on characteristics (such as number of children in the
household) may not achieve such a dramatic concentration of benefits on low-
income households, but neither will it have the unintended effect of discouraging
men and women with children from taking up paid employment.
To perform the major part of this analysis, the author exploited a new
microsimulation model of the Hungarian tax and benefit system which was built
by a team from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office and the Microsimulation
Unit at the University of Cambridge. This model is described briefly in Section
II. Section III discusses the development of family benefits in Hungary, the
reforms of April 1996 and their impact on household incomes. Section IV looks
at the development of means-testing in the UK and its impact on incentives. InMeans-Testing in Hungary
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Section V, the introduction of a more fully means-tested system of benefits
modelled on the UK system is analysed. Section VI summarises the main
findings of the analysis.
II. METHOD AND DATA
A tax–benefit microsimulation model is a computer program that runs on a
survey microdataset and calculates liability to taxes and eligibility for benefits
for sample observations, where the analyst varies policy proposals by altering
parameters in the program. In this analysis, a tax–benefit microsimulation model
was used to simulate the distributional and incentive effects of the system of
family benefits in Hungary: first, under the 1995 tax–benefit regime; second,
after the April 1996 reforms; and third, under a hypothetical regime based on the
UK system of family benefits. In using a microsimulation model, it is important
to understand both its complexities and its limitations. In particular, any model
can only be as good as the data that are available to it (Sutherland, 1991;
Redmond, Sutherland and Wilson, 1998). The Hungarian microsimulation model
used in this analysis runs on a sample of data from the 1995 Household Budget
Survey (HBS). The HBS is a large-scale survey of household incomes and
expenditures, with detailed information on the characteristics and incomes (as
well as expenditures) of a sample of 27,534 individuals who live in 10,582
households. The sample is reweighted to represent more closely the demographic
characteristics of the Hungarian population.
1
The Hungarian microsimulation model was programmed as a SAS
application. It is described in greater detail in Papp and Jarabek (1997). It is the
first durable microsimulation model to be built in Hungary for general policy
analysis since the beginning of the 1990s. It is a static model and is most suitable
for examining the immediate impacts of policy proposals. It is important to note
that no explicit behavioural response to the policies modelled in this paper is
assumed. That is, the sample’s household incomes may change as a result of the
policies simulated, but household members’ personal, labour-force and other
characteristics remain unchanged.
Most of this analysis concerns the study of decile groups of household
income, each of which contains the same number of weighted person-level
observations. Household income includes (for each household member) earnings
from employment and self-employment, other market earnings, private transfers,
simulated and reported state benefits, and imputed income from the consumption
of home production, less simulated income tax and social insurance liabilities.
Incomes are adjusted, or equivalised, to take account of differences in the size
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and composition of households, using the OECD equivalence scale, which gives
a weight of 1 to the first adult, 0.7 to subsequent adults and 0.5 to all children
aged under 14 in the household.
III. THE LEGACY OF COMMUNISM AND THE REFORM OF FAMILY
BENEFITS IN POST-COMMUNIST HUNGARY
1. Family Benefits in Communist Hungary
Family benefits have traditionally had an important place in Hungarian social
policy, in terms of both their contribution to the incomes of families with
children and the share of government expenditure devoted to them (Jarvis,
1995). Family Allowance, originally introduced in 1938, is the oldest and most
important benefit in Hungary for families with children. Under Communism, the
government provided a comprehensive range of employment-related benefits,
including a generous Family Allowance regime, paid childcare leave, free or
heavily subsidised nursery places for the young children of working mothers,
and maternity benefits. This comprehensive state welfare regime was designed
so as to encourage women to fulfil their roles as both waged workers and carers
(Ferge, 1979). In addition to Family Allowance, earnings-related maternity and
childcare allowances were available for mothers whose children were under the
age of three. These policies reflected Hungary’s pro-natalist orientation, the need
for more workers to increase production and the ideological commitment to a
high level of labour-force participation for both men and women.
This system of maternity and family benefits in Communist Hungary did not
just encourage women to remain attached to the labour force. It effectively
compelled them to work. First, eligibility to maternity and family benefits was
dependent on a qualifying formal employment record. Second, earnings were
effectively designed to support an individual rather than a couple or a family. A
couple in Communist Hungary would find it difficult to survive on one person’s
earnings from formal employment. A couple with children would have difficulty
in managing without family benefits, even if both partners worked.
The collapse of Communism, coupled with the quickening pace of economic
transition and an emerging crisis in government finances, prompted international
agencies, such as the World Bank (1995 and 1996) and the OECD (1995), to
urge comprehensive reform of the Hungarian welfare system. The solutions
proposed by these agencies focused on means-testing, so that overall benefit
expenditure could be reduced and benefits could be targeted at the poorest
households. However, the generosity of the Hungarian family benefits system, its
popularity and the fact that parts of it pre-dated the Communist regime made its
reform in transition Hungary problematic. This was compounded by two factors:
first, in the dying months of the Communist regime, new benefits, such as
Unemployment Benefit and Social Benefit (means-tested support forMeans-Testing in Hungary
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unemployed people with no entitlement to Unemployment Benefit), were
introduced and Family Allowance was transformed into a universal benefit;
second, the impact of transition itself, as both earnings and employment
declined, meant that the relative importance of family benefits increased as a
proportion of household incomes.
Therefore, in the first six years after the collapse of Communism, Hungarian
governments did little to reform the welfare system. The 1995 regime of state
support for families with children (summarised in Table 1) was more or less the
system inherited from Communism. The value of most cash benefits was greatly
eroded by inflation (as, indeed, was the value of earnings for most people), but
the overall structure of the system was retained. In addition to Family
TABLE 1
Summary of Cash Benefits Available for Families with Children in Hungary
1995 April 1996
Income tax Individual taxation — no extra benefits
for taxpayers with children




Family Allowance, payable to either
parent; extra for more children
Family Allowance means-tested for





Maternity Allowance and Childcare
Fee (GYED) until child’s second
birthday
Childcare Fee and Childcare
Allowance amalgamated into a means-
tested unified flat-rate benefit
Fixed-rate Childcare Allowance
(GYES) until child’s third birthday
Pregnant women could claim a
Pregnancy Allowance from 13th week
of pregnancy





Child-Raising Allowance (GYET) for
non-working mothers with three or
more young children (means-tested at a
high level)
Means-tested cash benefits: Social
Assistance, Social Benefit, Housing
Allowances and Temporary Crisis
Allowances (locally administered)
Family Allowance means-tested (see
above)
Eligibility to Childcare Allowance
became contingent on eligibility to
Family Allowance
Other locally-administered means-
tested support continuedFiscal Studies
82
Allowance, a Pregnancy Allowance was available (at the same rate as Family
Allowance) for women who were three or more months pregnant. Women who
had been employed for at least a year before the birth of their child were entitled
to Childcare Fee (GYED), which was equal to 65–70 per cent of a woman’s
previous wages and was paid until the child’s second birthday. Flat-rate
Childcare Allowance (GYES) was payable to mothers with an employment
record who remained out of the labour force until a child had reached the age of
three. In 1993, a new means-tested benefit — Child-Raising Allowance (GYET)
— was introduced. This was aimed at families with three or more children, the
youngest of whom was aged between three and eight. However, its importance
within the overall scheme of family benefits was small.
2. The Reform of Family Benefits in April 1996
During Hungary’s early years of transition, most women (even those with young
children) retained their attachment to the labour market. Institutional
arrangements, such as universal family benefits and the system of individual
earnings, strongly encouraged them to do so (Jarvis and Redmond, 1997). By
1995, women’s participation in the labour force had fallen no faster than that of
men. This was in spite of the considerable reduction in additional support
provided for working women with young children: for example, the number of
subsidised day and infant nursery places available to working women with young
children fell by 45 per cent between 1988 and 1995 (Hungarian Central
Statistical Office, 1991 and 1995).
2
In April 1996, in response to the deepening fiscal crisis and after a protracted
political and constitutional debate, a series of reforms to child-related benefits
was instituted. The reforms, introduced in April 1996 and summarised in Table
1, included:
•   the means-testing of Family Allowance for households with fewer than three
children; this was set at a relatively high level, with entitlement only
exhausted when per capita household income was about twice the minimum
pension;
3
•   the abolition of Pregnancy Allowance and its replacement with a Maternity
Payment of HUF 14,400, equal in value to about five months’ Pregnancy
Allowance for a woman expecting her first child;
                                                                                                                                   
2Evidence from the 1987 and 1995 HBSs does suggest, however, that women’s withdrawal from the labour
market was more selective than that of men, in that women in unskilled blue-collar occupations were more
likely to leave the labour force than unskilled blue-collar men.
3In 1995 and 1996, the minimum pension was HUF 9,600 per month (average net earnings were HUF 31,100
per month in 1996). It has been standard practice in Hungary to equivalise household needs on a per capita
basis. A more detailed description of Family Allowance before and after April 1996 is provided in Redmond
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•   the abolition of earnings-related Childcare Fee (GYED) and its amalgamation
into Childcare Allowance (GYES) for children born after April 1996. This
was awarded as a flat-rate benefit equal in value to the minimum pension
(HUF 9,600 per month), a 28 per cent increase in the value of GYES prior to
April 1996. After that date, however, GYES was only available to parents
who satisfied the means test for Family Allowance.
3. The Full Impact of the April 1996 Reforms on Government Expenditures and
Household Incomes
In this analysis, we model the impact of the April 1996 policy reforms at their
mature state by assuming that everybody experiences the full impact of the
policy shock from when it is implemented. This enables us to examine more
adequately the intended and unintended consequences of the policy reforms.
Table 2 shows that the simulated aggregate impact of these reforms resulted in
an overall reduction in expenditure on these benefits of HUF 15.7 billion.
4
Means-testing Family Allowance has the greatest impact: the amount of this
benefit paid to households decreases by more than HUF 10 billion, and 184,000
households are judged ineligible as a result of the reform. The abolition of
GYED results in a saving in public expenditure of HUF 18.6 billion, but of the
178,000 claimants who lose entitlement, at least 99,000 are judged eligible for
GYES. Expenditure on this benefit almost doubles, from HUF 13.4 billion under
                                                                                                                                   
4As an earnings-related benefit, GYED was taxable, while, as a means-tested benefit, GYES is not taxable but
subject to a 6 per cent social insurance contribution. Simulated income tax revenues decrease by HUF 1.5
billion as a result of this reform, so the net simulated saving in expenditure is just over HUF 14 billion.
TABLE 2
Simulated Aggregate Costs of Pre- and Post-April 1996 Hungarian Family Benefit
Regimes and Numbers of Claimants













Family and Pregnancy Allowance 103.3 1,443 92.9 1,259
Childcare Fee (GYED) 18.6 178 0 0
Childcare Allowance (GYES) 13.4 184 25.9 283
Maternity Payment 0 0 0.8 57
Social Assistance and Social Benefit 22.5 400 22.5 400
Total 157.8 142.1
Source: Microsimulation model, using 1995 Hungarian HBS, updated to 1996.Fiscal Studies
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the 1995 regime to HUF 25.9 billion under the 1996 regime. About HUF 1
billion of the reduction of expenditure on Family and Pregnancy Allowance is
accounted for by the abolition of Pregnancy Allowance. Of this, HUF 0.8 billion
is spent on the new Maternity Payment from April 1996.
These reforms, particularly the means-testing of Family Allowance, were
radical in the Hungarian context, even though they were formulated in such a
way that only relatively well-off households would be affected. Moreover, the
amalgamation of GYED into GYES, and its means-testing (although not the
means-testing of Family Allowance), were only instituted in respect of babies
born after April 1996. Thus, as Rédei, Lakatos and Éltetõ (1998) show, the
initial impact of these reforms was not severe.
Although the aggregate reduction in family-related benefits paid to Hungarian
households is quite large, the distributional impact on all household incomes is
small. On average, Hungarian households lose 0.6 per cent of their pre-reform
incomes as a result of the reforms. However, only households with dependent
children are affected by the reforms. These comprise about 56 per cent of all
Hungarian households, and it is on this group that the analysis will concentrate.
FIGURE 1
Distribution of Income and Children among Hungarian Households:
1995 Family Benefit Regime
Source: Microsimulation model, using 1995 Hungarian HBS, updated to 1996.
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Figure 1 shows average equivalised household incomes by decile group under
the 1995 regime, and the distribution of households with different numbers of
children across decile groups. The distribution of households with no children,
or one or two children, is fairly even across decile groups, but almost half (45
per cent) of people living in households with three or more children are in the
poorest fifth of the Hungarian population. It is here that the problem of poverty
among households with children is concentrated, and it is here that many of the
government initiatives aimed at alleviating poverty have been aimed. For
example, as we saw from Table 1, Child-Raising Allowance (GYET) was
exclusively aimed at households with three or more children, and this group was
exempted from the means-testing of Family Allowance from April 1996.
Figure 2 shows how the April 1996 reforms affect the incomes of households
with children. The bars indicate that, among all households with children, people
living in households in the bottom two deciles gain slightly on average, while
people living in households in the remaining deciles lose on average. The losses
are small in the middle of the distribution, but amount to about 3 per cent of pre-
reform incomes among people living in households in the top decile. The greater
losses experienced by people living in households in the top three deciles are
FIGURE 2
Distributional Impact of April 1996 Reforms
on Hungarian Households with Children
Source: Microsimulation model, using 1995 Hungarian HBS, updated to 1996.
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caused by the means-testing of Family Allowance, which has almost no impact
on households in the remaining deciles.
If we examine the impact of the reforms on households with different
numbers of children, the results fluctuate rather more. These fluctuations are
mostly caused by the abolition of GYED and its replacement with increased
GYES, which causes some households to gain and some to lose, and to a lesser
extent by the abolition of Pregnancy Allowance and its replacement with
Maternity Payment.
As is evident from Figure 1, people living in households with three or more
children are concentrated in the bottom deciles. Therefore calculations of
average gains and losses among households in this group above the third decile
are based on small sample sizes, are unreliable and are not shown on Figure 2.
However, Figure 2 does show that, while households with three or more children
in the bottom decile gained slightly as a result of the reforms, households with
three or more children in the second and third deciles lost. Overall, households
with three or more children saw their childcare payments (GYES and GYED)
decrease by more than 3 per cent on average. The abolition of Pregnancy
Allowance also adversely affected households with three children, since
Pregnancy Allowance was higher for a woman expecting her third child than for
a woman expecting her first or second child, while the Maternity Payment which
replaced it is a flat-rate lump sum which does not take numbers of children into
account.
The impact of benefits on incentives to work is often seen as a crucial
criterion on which the efficacy of a reform package is judged. In the case of
Hungary under the Communist regime, the impact of benefits on incentives was
not considered problematic for three reasons: because most benefits were
employment-related; because neither of the principal causes of disincentives in
western social security systems — means tests and income taxes — was
significant; and because most working-age adults were effectively compelled to
work. With the exception of earnings-related Unemployment Benefit, which was
introduced at quite generous rates just before the collapse of Communism
(Micklewright and Nagy, 1997), this situation continued for most people into the
1990s.
Incentives to work are often measured through effective marginal tax rates —
the amount of taxes paid and benefits lost as a proportion of an extra unit of
income earned. Figure 3 shows that the reforms of April 1996, even though they
introduced means-testing, do not appear to have had a large impact on the
effective marginal tax rates paid by working Hungarian households. Except in
the highest deciles, where the means-testing of Family Allowance takes effect,
average effective marginal tax rates on an extra HUF 10,000 earned by the main
earner in a year remain very much the same under the 1995 and 1996 regimes,
and also remain relatively low, even for households with three or more children:Means-Testing in Hungary
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FIGURE 3
Average Effective Marginal Tax Rates
under 1995 and 1996 Hungarian Family Benefits Regimes:
All Households with Earners and Children
Source: Microsimulation model, using 1995 Hungarian HBS, updated to 1996.
under some western social security systems, effective marginal tax rates of over
90 per cent for certain workers are not uncommon (see Evans (1996)).
IV. THE CONTINUING GROWTH OF MEANS-TESTING IN
HUNGARY: LESSONS FROM THE UK
1. The Growth of Means-Testing in Hungary
The reforms to family benefits described in Section III constituted an important
psychological shift in the orientation of social policy in Hungary, away from
universalist and contingent policies and towards means-testing. Even before
these reforms had been instituted, means-testing was already becoming more
prevalent. We have already noted that Child-Raising Allowance (GYET),
introduced in 1993, was means-tested. Other means-tested benefits, such as
Social Assistance, had been introduced for families experiencing severe hardship
during the Communist regime. Towards the end of the Communist era, Social
Benefit was introduced as a benefit for claimants of earnings-related
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Unemployment Benefit who had exhausted their entitlement. These means-tested
benefits are administered in accordance with local conditions and criteria by
local authorities and councils.
5 As Micklewright and Nagy (1997) point out, it
cannot be assumed, in these circumstances, that entitlement to benefits is either
claimed or accurately assessed. This makes it difficult to model entitlement using
standard microsimulation techniques. However, aggregate data indicate the
increasing importance of these benefits in post-Communist Hungary, even before
the reforms of April 1996. Table 3 shows that, while the significance of the
biggest non-means-tested benefits (Family Allowance and Unemployment
Benefit) declined markedly between 1993 and 1995, spending on means-tested
benefits increased. But in comparison with the UK, where almost one-third of
total social security expenditure was in the form of means-tested benefits in
1993, expenditure on means-tested benefits in Hungary in 1995 was, at 6.7 per
cent of total social security expenditure, still small. The reforms of April 1996
are likely to have increased the importance of means-testing in Hungary
considerably.
Moreover, the importance of means-testing is likely to continue to grow in
Hungary. This appears evident from the introduction of a new means-tested
                                                                                                                                   
5Social Assistance legislation was rationalised in 1993, but Social Assistance was still left to (mostly small)
local authorities to administer.
TABLE 3
Expenditure on Selected Social Security Benefits in the UK and Hungary,
as a Percentage of Total Social Security Expenditure
Per cent
UK 1993 Hungary 1993 1995
Means-tested Means-tested
Family Credit 1.4 Childcare assistance 0.1 0.4
Housing Benefit 10.1 Regular Social Assistance 2.6 4.0
Income Support 20.0 Non-regular Social Assistance 1.1 1.2
Other cash benefits 0.2 1.0
Total 31.6 Total 4.1 6.7
Non-means-tested Non-means-tested
Child and One-Parent Benefit 7.6 Family Allowance 15.5 11.3
Unemployment Benefit 1.9 Unemployment Benefit 8.0 7.0
Sources: UK — Central Statistical Office, 1995, Table 3.5.
Hungary — Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 1995, Table 15.2; Hungarian Central Statistical
Office, 1996, Table 5.3.Means-Testing in Hungary
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benefit — Permanent Child Protection Support — in November 1997.
6 This
benefit targets very-low-income families with children aged under 14. As with
Child-Raising Allowance, benefit amounts per child are relatively small, but,
unlike Social Assistance, this benefit is centrally administered. Its introduction at
this time suggests that a bureaucracy capable of large-scale means-testing is
being developed, and the shift towards means-testing in Hungary appears set to
continue.
2. A Model for Hungary? Family Benefits, Means Tests and Participation in the
UK
McLaughlin (1994), in her analysis of the development of the modern British
Welfare State, argues that, in the formative period of its establishment, the
relatively greater political power of working-class men compared with women,
the partial overlap of the interests of employers and employees as family men,
and the interest of the nation state in women as reproducers and carers, joined to
make the male breadwinner the key institutional basis of the British Welfare
State. One consequence of the ‘breadwinner’ ethos was that family benefits in
the UK never assumed the importance that they did in Hungary. Family benefits
in the 1990s were almost exclusively means-tested in the UK. Figure 4 shows
how means tests targeted benefits on families with low levels of market income.
Basic-level Income Support for a non-employed couple with two children and no
other income was worth about £100 per week in 1997. But if one member of the
couple earned £80 per week, then Family Credit, which was only available to
working families, together with universal Child Benefit, would boost the
family’s net income to £180. However, in order to increase family incomes by a
further £20, the employed person would have to earn £170: the combined
incidence of income taxes and withdrawal of Family Credit at a rate of 70 pence
for each extra pound earned ensured that effective marginal tax rates were
extremely high over this range of earnings. Thus if the wife of a low-paid man in
the UK also entered low-paid employment, the family might not gain much in
terms of net income, and might lose out if costs associated with travelling to and
from work and with childcare were taken into account.
The combined impact of the family (or breadwinner’s) wage and an
orientation towards means-testing often deterred women from entering low-paid
work. Jarvis and Redmond (1997) argue that this factor helps explain the
relatively higher rates of child poverty in the UK compared with Hungary in
1993.
                                                                                                                                   
6Nominal rates of Family Allowance were also increased in 1997 for the first time in five years. However, these




Incomes and Taxes in the UK in 1997:
Married Full-Time Earner with Two Children and Spouse Not in Paid Employment
(assuming no housing costs or local taxes)
Source: POLIMOD — UK microsimulation model.
It is important to note that economic transition had a huge impact on the
participation patterns of both men and women in Hungary. Table 4 compares
employment patterns among households with children in the UK in 1993 with
those in Hungary in 1987 and 1995. This shows that, among people living in
households with children, the proportion of two-parent households where neither
parent was employed increased more than fourfold in Hungary between 1987
and 1995, from 2.5 to 11.4 per cent. This latter figure was higher than that for
the UK in 1993. In almost a quarter (24 per cent) of Hungarian households with
children, only the man was employed in 1987, but in 62.1 per cent of these
observations, the woman was on maternity or childcare leave. By 1995, the
proportion of households where only the man worked had increased to nearly 32
per cent of all households with children; in half of these, the woman was on
maternity or childcare leave. In the UK, very few women were on maternity
leave, a reflection of the very short period of eligibility for maternity benefits in
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the UK.
7 The proportion of Hungarian households with children where both the
man and the woman worked was 64 per cent in 1987, but only 39 per cent in
1995. This proportion is lower than that in the UK in 1993, where in 47 per cent
of households with children, both members of a couple were employed.
TABLE 4














10.3 2.5 11.4 +8.9
Of which:
woman on maternity or
childcare leave










22.2 24.0 31.7 +7.7
Of which:
woman on maternity or
childcare leave












10.9 1.1 4.4 +3.3
Of which:
woman on maternity or
childcare leave
0 18.1 13.6 –4.5
Total 100 100 100
Sources: 1987 and 1995 Hungarian HBSs; Jarvis and Redmond, 1997.
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The huge reduction in dual-earning households in Hungary between 1987 and
1995 is explained partly by the withdrawal by both men and women from
employment as a result of economic transition, but also by the large number of
Hungarian women on maternity or childcare leave. Overall, in spite of the severe
effects of economic transition, nearly 70 per cent of all working-age women with
children in Hungary were working or were on maternity or childcare leave in
1995, compared with less than 60 per cent in the UK in 1993. Moreover, it is
important to remember that, while a considerable proportion of employed
women with dependent children in the UK work part-time, this is very rare in
Hungary — nearly all employed men and women in Hungary work full-time.
Therefore, in spite of the severe impact of economic transition, women with
children in Hungary in the 1990s clearly still had a strong attachment to the
labour market. There were perhaps three reasons for this: first, the State
encouraged them to do so, through the structure of benefits offered; second, the
structure of earnings was such that both men and women were compelled to
work in order to provide for themselves and their children; and third, earnings
differentials between men and women were considerably lower in Hungary than
in the UK. The extension of means-testing, while improving the targeting of
benefits in Hungary, might also create incentive barriers to employment,
particularly the employment of women returning from maternity or childcare
leave. In the next section, we simulate the impact of introducing a UK-style
means-tested benefits system in Hungary.
V. THE IMPACT OF INCREASED TARGETING IN HUNGARY
In order to simulate the introduction of a more tightly means-tested and targeted
social security regime in Hungary, we introduce three major benefits which
feature in Figure 4 and form the backbone of the UK family benefits system —
Income Support, Child Benefit and Family Credit.
8 The simulated Hungarian
system incorporates the general rules of the UK system.
9
Thus:
•   Child Benefit is paid in respect of all dependent children in the household at a
flat per-child rate, with a premium for the first child and an extra amount
(Single-Parent Rate)
10 for single parents, and is not subject to a means test.
•   Family Credit is only available to families where a parent is employed for at
least 16 hours per week. The maximum amount of Family Credit payable
depends on the number and ages of children in the family. This maximum
                                                                                                                                   
8Some important benefits (notably, Housing Benefit) are not simulated because of the problems associated with
developing comparable indicators of housing costs in the UK and Hungary.
9However, the Hungarian, rather than the UK, definition of a dependent child is maintained. The UK definition
is slightly more restrictive than that used by the Hungarian tax–benefit system.
10This was abolished in April 1998.Means-Testing in Hungary
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amount is reduced according to a 70 per cent taper if family income (after tax
and some disregards) is higher than a fixed threshold. Child Benefit is not
included in the means test for Family Credit.
•   Income Support (which in the UK is a basic-social-assistance-type benefit) is
only available where neither parent works, and is subject to a means test with
very few disregards and a 100 per cent taper; that is, income of, say, HUF
1,000 from most sources, including Child Benefit, would result in a HUF
1,000 withdrawal of Income Support. Maximum amounts of Income Support
vary according to whether the claimant is single or in a couple, their age (it is
less generous for single people aged under 25 and more generous for people
over pension age), and the number and ages of children in the family.
In applying the benefits to the Hungarian situation, the following rules are
maintained:
•   The unit of receipt and means-testing for benefits is the nuclear family (single
people, couples without children, and single people or couples with
dependent children). This is a departure from the Hungarian practice of
treating the resource unit for means-testing as the household or even the
extended family.
•   Benefit rates are set in relation to the minimum pension level (HUF 9,600 per
month) in Hungary in 1996, but the benefit relativities of the UK system in
1996–97 are maintained. Therefore all benefit rates are translated into a
proportion of the Income Support rate for a single adult. Under the UK
system, a single working-age adult eligible for Income Support received a
maximum of £47.90 per week in 1996–97; this is assumed to equate to HUF
9,600 per month under the Hungarian system. In the UK, a couple receiving
Income Support would get £75.20 per week, or 1.57 times the single adult
rate. Therefore a couple in Hungary receives HUF 9,600 × 1.57, or HUF
15,072, per month if entitled to full Income Support. Similarly, Child Benefit
for the first child in a family equals £10.80 under the UK system, or 0.225
times the single adult Income Support rate, so Child Benefit in Hungary is set
at HUF 2,160 per month for the first child, or 0.225 times the monthly
minimum pension rate.
•   The three UK benefits are assumed to replace the following benefits in the
1995 Hungarian system: Family Allowance, Childcare Fee (GYED),
Childcare Allowance (GYES), Child-Raising Allowance (GYET), Social
Benefit, and casual and long-term Social Assistance.
•   Take-up of 100 per cent is assumed for all three benefits. This is a potentially
contentious assumption, since studies show that take-up of in-work benefits,
in particular, tends to be less than complete. However, to assume incomplete
take-up in a simulation exercise, it is necessary to choose which eligible
families in the microdataset are to take up benefits, and this is a perilousFiscal Studies
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exercise without detailed information on take-up behaviour, which is not
currently available for Hungary.
•   As is the case throughout this paper, no explicit behavioural response (for
example, in terms of labour supply) to the introduction of the UK-style
benefits system is assumed.
Table 5 shows the aggregate costs associated with introducing a UK-style
means-tested system in Hungary with benefit levels set in relation to the
minimum pension of HUF 9,600 per month. The total cost of social security
transfers to families with children falls from HUF 157.8 billion under the 1995
system to HUF 140.7 billion under the UK-style regime, a saving of about HUF
1 billion more than is achieved under the April 1996 reforms. Because of its
relatively low value, Child Benefit is 40 per cent cheaper than Family and
Pregnancy Allowance, although the number of recipients is about the same.
Under the 1995 Hungarian regime, Social Benefit and Social Assistance are
available for families with and without paid employment, hence the wider
coverage (about 400,000 households) than is the case for Income Support, which
is restricted to families without paid employment. Simulated Income Support
costs are slightly higher than those associated with Social Benefit and Social
Assistance. However, Income Support also replaces GYED and GYES for some
claimants. Family Credit replaces GYED and GYES in cases where a woman’s
husband is employed. The importance of Family Credit, and the number of
families affected by it, are indicative of the fact that many parents of dependent
children in Hungary are employed on very low earnings.
TABLE 5
Simulated Aggregate Costs and Numbers of Claimants under 1995 Hungarian
Family Benefits Regime and UK-Style Means-Tested System













Family and Pregnancy Allowance 103.3 1,443
Childcare Fee (GYED) 18.6 178
Childcare Allowance (GYES) 13.4 184
Social Benefit and Social Assistance 22.5 400
Income Support 25.2 216
Family Credit 52.2 519
Child Benefit 63.3 1,484
Total 157.8 140.7
Source: Microsimulation model, using 1995 Hungarian HBS, updated to 1996.Means-Testing in Hungary
95
FIGURE 5
Targeting of Family Benefits under 1995, 1996 and UK-Style Regimes:
Households with Children
Source: Microsimulation model, using 1995 Hungarian HBS, updated to 1996.
Figure 5 compares average incomes and the targeting of family-related
benefits under the simulated 1995 and April 1996 regimes and the UK-style
regime. It shows that, under the UK-style system, households with children in
the bottom two deciles clearly gain from a move to increased means-testing,
which targets benefits towards the bottom of the distribution. Average
equivalised incomes in the bottom decile increase from HUF 127,000 to HUF
147,000 as a result of the policy switch from the 1995 regime to the UK-style
regime — a gain of 16 per cent. This compares very favourably with the 0.6 per
cent gain experienced by households with children in the bottom decile from the
April 1996 reforms. At the other end of the scale, however, households in the top
decile only lose out fractionally (by about 0.5 per cent) under the UK-style
regime compared with the 1995 regime. This is because Child Benefit in the UK-
style regime, like Family Allowance in 1995 — but not after April 1996 — is a
universal benefit.
If the aim of social security is solely to target benefits on those who have
least, then the UK-style system is considerably superior to both the 1995 and the
April 1996 regimes. The right-hand scale of Figure 5 shows that, under the 1995
regime, 31 per cent of total expenditure on family-related benefits is
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concentrated on the bottom two deciles; this figure improves to 33 per cent under
the April 1996 regime, and to 44 per cent under the UK-style regime.
However, as is the case in the UK, this means-tested system produces high
effective marginal tax rates for a considerable number of working families.
Figure 6 shows that, compared with the average effective marginal tax rates
experienced by working families under the 1995 regime (which, as Figure 3
shows, do not change greatly as a result of the April 1996 reforms), the average
effective tax rates experienced by working households under the UK-style
regime are very high, rising to over 80 per cent in the second decile, and
remaining at over 70 per cent in the third decile, among households with three or
more children. Among households with two children, effective marginal tax rates
are almost as high in the bottom three deciles. Over a third of working
households have effective marginal tax rates of 70 per cent or more.
Table 6 examines in greater detail the characteristics of these households with
high effective marginal tax rates. It shows that households with three or more
children are greatly over-represented: they constitute 13.6 per cent of working
households in the sample but 24.8 per cent of working households that
experience high effective marginal tax rates. Households with single parents are
FIGURE 6
Average Marginal Tax Rates from 1995 and UK-Style Family Benefit Regimes,
by Number of Children: All Households with Earners and Children
Source: Microsimulation model, using 1995 Hungarian HBS, updated to 1996.
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also over-represented: they make up 9.5 per cent of the working sample but 14.7
per cent of those with high effective marginal tax rates. Households with single
parents, and those where only one parent works, together make up three-quarters
of all households experiencing high marginal tax rates.
This suggests that, if high effective marginal tax rates are seen as a deterrent
to earning more from employment, or indeed to earning at all, then it is these
households that will be most affected. In such a scenario, the practical solution
for many families might be that one partner (usually the woman) might stay at
home to care for the children, while the other partner (usually the man) might,
with the help of in-work benefits, earn something approximating a ‘family
wage’. Two factors might militate against this kind of scenario developing for
many families. First, women developed a tradition during the Communist era of
working full-time, and they might be reluctant to relinquish the independence
that this brings (Corrin, 1994). Second, unlike in the UK, where women’s
earnings are, on average, considerably lower than those of men, women’s
earnings in Hungary are almost equal to those of men. However, it is possible
that, over the long term, a fully means-tested system of family benefits could
begin to have an impact on the structure of earnings in Hungary and facilitate the
creation of permanent poverty traps from which families find it difficult to
escape. The impact of the further extension of means-testing in Hungary,
particularly in terms of incentives to work, should be carefully considered before
being implemented.
TABLE 6
The Impact of a UK-Style Family Benefits System:





Households with one child 39.4 29.0
Households with two children 47.0 46.2
Households with three or more children 13.6 24.8
Households headed by a single parent 9.5 14.7
Households where one member of a couple works 38.6 59.8
Households where both members of a couple work 52.5 25.4
Source: Microsimulation model, using 1995 Hungarian HBS, updated to 1996.Fiscal Studies
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VI. CONCLUSION
This paper shows that the effect on household incomes of the April 1996 reforms
to family benefits in Hungary was mild and even benign. People living in
households at the very bottom of the income distribution were actually slightly
better off after the reforms, while people living in households at the top of the
income distribution were the only ones who lost out substantially. The
introduction of means tests at such levels that only relatively well-off households
were affected, and the maintenance of benefits for all families with three or more
children, ensured that effective marginal tax rates experienced by Hungarian
households with children remained low. As a result, incentives to work were not
greatly affected. But the reforms had a deeper psychological effect: they
introduced the principle of large-scale and centralised means-testing for
hundreds of thousands of Hungarian households. This centralised administrative
means-testing apparatus had the potential to form the basis of a fully means-
tested social security system.
This paper examined the impact of introducing one model of such a system
— a UK-style system of family benefits. In the UK, these benefits are associated
with poverty traps from which many families with children find it difficult to
escape. A like scenario might arise in Hungary if similar policies were
introduced there: the targeting of benefits towards the poorest households would
improve considerably, but at the cost of increasing effective marginal tax rates to
prohibitive levels for a very large number of households, particularly households
with three or more children and households with only one worker. Under the
current Hungarian system, even after the April 1996 reforms, there are
comparatively few direct disincentives for parents to work. Under a UK-style
system, many parents, perhaps mothers in particular, might find paid
employment less economically rewarding.
Policies that, over the longer term, encourage increased withdrawal of
women, particularly women with children, from the labour market are also likely
to entrench the position of many families with children at the bottom of the
income distribution. This is especially the case in Hungary, where people living
in households with three or more children are already over-represented at the
bottom of the income distribution. Such households were exempted from means-
testing for most family benefits under the April 1996 reforms. The long-term
effects of increased means-testing for these and other households in Hungary are
in need of careful appraisal now, before additional schemes are introduced.
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